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ABSTRACT: 
 
The paper specifies a model of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral 
system in which political parties themselves float independent candidates 
to gain electoral advantage, leading to a Prisoners’ Dilemma type game 
where each party tries to out-maneuver one another. Imposing some 
intuitively appealing assumptions on this game, we show that the total 
number of independent candidates across constituencies would follow a 
Negative Binomial distribution. Empirical results for the 2004 
parliamentary election in India reveal a good fit of the Negative Binomial 
model to data. Results also help to identify a few major determinants of 
the spatial distribution of independent candidates in India. Results point 
out that the number of independent candidates across constituencies in a 
State in India is strongly influenced by political fractionalization in that 
State, with metropolitan and urban constituencies on an average having 
more independent candidates.  We also find that elite politicians and their 
family members, ceteris paribus, face more independent candidates. 
Finally, results establish that number of independent candidates is 
typically less in reserved constituencies due to reduced number of 
potential candidates. Our results suggest that FPTP electoral systems as 
in India need to put appropriate institutional constraints that increase 
transaction costs of electoral participation for independent candidates. 
 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In politics, an “independent” is defined as one who is not affiliated with any 
political party. Generally such a person runs in an election without the 
support of any political party. Internationally, independent candidates have                                                         
1 The views expressed in this paper are personal and not necessarily of the institution 
the author belongs to. The author is grateful to Harihar Bhattacharyya, Sukumar 
Nandi and an anonymous referee whose comments and suggestions greatly 
improved an earlier exposition. The author bears full responsibility for any error. 
2 The author can be contacted at: kbhattacharya@iiml.ac.in 
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played important roles in different countries in different stages of political 
development. In old and established democracies like the UK or Canada, 
independent candidates have won elections frequently. In relatively new 
democracies like India, independents have actively participated in the 
electoral process. In recent years, independents have also contributed 
significantly in the political developments in South Africa, Russia and 
transitional economies in East Europe.   
 
This paper attempts to explain the reasons behind the emergence of 
independent candidates and also attempts to trace its spatial determinants.  
Without the institutional support of a political party, independent candidates 
not only have to bear the risk of losing, but often also have to bear the risk of 
forfeiture of deposit. Therefore, a natural question to ask is: what is his/her 
incentive?  More importantly, we ask: what type of political environments in 
general, and what type of constituencies in particular, induce individuals to 
run as independent candidates? We argue that these questions are important 
from both theoretical and practical perspectives and that existing political 
and economic literature have not addressed them in sufficient detail. 
 
In an ideal world, independents would hold a centrist viewpoint in a 
relatively polarized political environment. They may also have a viewpoint 
on specific issues or policies. Therefore, one reason for their taking part in 
electoral politics could be grievance against existing politicians and/or 
policies.  Independent candidates could also be a former member of a 
political party and stand in election as rebels. A third category of 
independents are those who may support a political party but believe that 
they should not formally commit to be its member. Fourth category could be 
free-riders who, by paying a limited cost, enjoy and utilize the free publicity 
that elections offer them. Finally, independent candidates could also be 
cranks who run for idiosyncratic reasons (Canon, 1993).3 Unfortunately, 
neither standard voting theories nor the existing theories of coalition 
formation in democracies provide clear and unambiguous characterization of 
situations that would lead to the emergence of independent candidates in 
elections.  
 
The starting point of the literature on voting is the median voter theory. 
As per this theory, in a first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system, if voters’ 
preferences can be represented by a uni-dimensional single-peak distribution 
and if there are two political parties, to win elections both the political 
parties would then tend to pick up the preferences of voters in or around the 
median of this distribution. Depending upon the purpose of the study, the 
simple median voter framework has been extended in different ways. In a 
seminal review article, Osborne (1995) has shown that if there are more than 
two (potential) candidates, then the basic incentive inherent in the two-party 
model is significantly diluted. If information is perfect and voting is costless, 
then enough of the incentive may survive so that all candidates who enter the 
competition choose similar policy positions. In such cases, if the distribution 
reflecting voters’ preference is highly heterogeneous, one reason of the 
emergence of smaller parties and independent candidates would be to fill up                                                         
3 Theoretically, there could be a method in madness. In economies with weak 
institutional structure, a “crank” may run as independent (i) if the transaction cost of 
running as independent is low compared to  “donations” expected from him by the 
existing political parties, or, (ii) to avoid the “hazards” of anticipated election duties.  
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ideological vacuums created by major party competition (Rosenstone et al, 
1996). However, it may be noted that when information is imperfect, results 
are unclear.  
 
Existing studies have pointed out that presence of a third party or 
independent candidates could distort the results in an election. In the context 
of the US, Abramson et al (1995) has reviewed the experience with third 
party and independent candidates in the context of US presidential elections. 
Also, Heckelman and Yates (2008) have shown both theoretically and 
empirically that in the presence of independent candidates, two state senators 
will generally not be from opposite parties and will be closer in ideological 
space than if they were elected under strict two-party competition. Majority 
of these studies are, however, in the context of developed countries and 
implicitly assume the existence of two major political parties. Further, these 
studies focus on the outcomes of elections and not on the factors that lead to 
the emergence of independent candidates.  
 
It is well known that in a politically charged atmosphere, independent 
candidates could play a decisive role in an election. Therefore, in a FPTP 
electoral system where even a single vote could make the difference between 
the winner and the losers, for independent candidates, the very motive of 
standing in an election may not be winning per se, but to influence the 
outcome through participation. A major incentive here is to engage in 
bargaining with the mainstream political parties and eventually, to cut a deal 
with one of them in the long-run. 
 
In the context of the US, recently Lem and Dowling (2006) have 
specified a model that attempts to explain the emergence of smaller parties 
and independent candidates in gubernatorial elections. In the empirical part, 
they have specified and estimated a Negative Binomial model to account for 
the count data properties of the number of such candidates. Lem and 
Dowling (2006) have identified several factors (e.g., political competition, 
constituency size, population density, legal and institutional hurdles across 
States etc.) that explain the emergence of independent candidates. However, 
this study – although it enhances our understanding significantly – suffers 
from two major limitations. First, it has not addressed the complex 
interaction among mainstream political parties and independent candidates 
in sufficient detail. Such interactions might have important implications in 
all democracies, especially in developing and emerging market economies 
with a FPTP electoral system in place. Second and more importantly, the 
Negative Binomial specification in the empirical part of their study is ad hoc 
and is based on statistical convenience. In particular, it does not emerge out 
of a set of deductive arguments. 
 
In the theoretical framework proposed in this paper, we argue that 
independent candidates could be dummies floated by political parties 
themselves to gain electoral advantage. That mainstream political parties 
have incentives to float dummy independent candidates has been recognized 
for a long time (McKnight, 1999). FPTP electoral systems are likely to be 
more vulnerable to this type of electoral behavior because in such systems, 
difference of even a few votes may turn out to be crucial.  
 
The dummies floated by political parties could be “clones” of its major 
rivals, the underlying idea being to confuse voters intending to vote for its 
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rivals.  Floating independents may also help parties to have additional 
electoral agents in different polling booths in a constituency. In many 
developing and emerging market economies, sometimes it is difficult to 
establish identities of voters. Support or objection of a “neutral” agent may 
convince electoral officers about identities of voters more than the agents of 
mainstream parties. Having additional agents in booths may, therefore, help 
parties to “pass on” false voters as true ones or prevent genuine voters from 
voting.  
 
Whatever be the underlying motives of the political parties, we attempt 
to show that this unsavory behavior, if carried out by all political parties, 
leads to a prisoners’ dilemma type political game. We also show that when 
this game unfolds, it has certain implications on the spatial distribution of 
independent candidates. Although in principle this type of political game 
may start in any FPTP electoral system any time, standard results in game 
theory indicate that they are more likely to start in a fragmented polity 
because in such a situation all political parties have incentives to float 
dummies. Further, common sense also suggests that economies with weak 
institutional practices would be more vulnerable from this type of political 
behavior. Taken together, an implication of these observations is that for 
potential applications of this theory, one should study voting patterns of 
developing and emerging market economies rather than developed countries 
with relatively stronger institutional structure and with two major political 
parties in place.  
 
In this paper an attempt is made to model the spatial distribution of 
independent candidates in India. To convince readers, we now argue why 
India would be a good case study. In terms of scale of operation, logistics 
and active involvement of number of people, Indian parliamentary election is 
one of the biggest events in the world. Election of the lower house (Lok 
Sabha) of the parliament in India is carried out under FPTP rule. Since 
independence in 1947, Lok Sabha elections have been held in India fifteen 
times. However, even with more than sixty years of democratic experience, 
results of these elections suggest that a clear bi-party system in India is yet to 
emerge at the central level.  
 
Because of its lack of an effective bi-party system at the central level, 
India would be a good case to examine the role political fragmentation plays 
in the emergence of independent candidates. Being a large country with a lot 
of diversities, it is no surprise that different parts of India react differently to 
parliamentary elections. While many smaller units like States show signs of 
emergence of a bi-party system, politics at the central level in India is still 
guided by complex political coalitions involving both national and regional 
parties.   
 
In the Indian context, there are several benchmark studies on party 
system and coalition making. In an early and seminal study, Kothari (1970) 
identified some of the specialties and complexities of the Indian political 
process. Studies like Weiner (1978) analyzed the socio-political implications 
of the benchmark 1977 Lok Sabha election in India.  Subsequent studies like 
Mitra and Singh (1999) and Chhibber (1999) have examined the linkage 
between social cleavages and political parties and their gradual changes over 
time. These later studies attempt to explain the complex coalition politics in 
India in terms of multiple cleavages like caste, religion, language, region and 
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social and economic classes. However, besides the relational dynamics of 
different political parties in India over space and time, a major feature of 
Indian parliamentary elections is the large number of independent 
candidates. None of these studies offer a systematic explanation of this 
phenomenon.4 This is surprising because common sense suggests that when 
coalition governance is the order of the day, that governance structure may 
itself lead to participation of too many independent candidates and, in turn, 
enhance the complexity of political management. 
  
In the specific context of India, political importance of independent 
candidates has varied substantially over the years. In the Lok Sabha elections 
in 1962 and and 1967 in India, independent candidates won 20 and 35 seats 
respectively. However, since 1970s, number of seats won by independent 
candidates has decreased substantially. During early years of Indian 
democracy, the high number of independent candidates in an election used to 
cost the public exchequer in India severely.5 Other costs like security costs 
were also high. If for example, an independent candidate died (or, was 
murdered), election in that constituency would be postponed. In a politically 
volatile or charged atmosphere, such a situation – though infrequent – 
happened in India.6 Because of these institutional weaknesses, during the 
1996 parliamentary election in India, a total of 10,635 independent 
candidates appeared in a total of 543 parliamentary seats. Electoral reforms 
and the use of electronic voting machines led to a decrease in independent 
candidates subsequently. Still, Lok Sabha elections in 1998, 1999 and 2004 
had 1,915, 1,945 and 2,385 independent candidates respectively. These 
numbers are still high, especially if one considers one of the earliest 
democracies like the United Kingdom as benchmark.7 
 
This paper attempts to provide a systematic explanation of the 
emergence of independent candidates in the Parliamentary election in India                                                         
4 To put the lack of discussion on this area in perspective, we note that the very word 
“Independent” is not present in the “Index” part of the books of Kothari (1970),  
Mitra and Singh (1999) and Chhibber (1999). Winer (1978) too has discussed this 
aspect scantily, observing that “In any event, the number of votes received by most 
independent candidates was very small, often only 1 or 2 per cent of the total vote” 
(p. 83).  
5 For example, during the assembly election in Tamil Nadu, India, in 1996, 
Modaurichi assembly constituency had 1033 candidates.  During Parliamentary 
elections in the same year, Nalgonda constituency in Andhra Pradesh and Belgaum 
constituency in Karnataka had 480 and 456 candidates respectively. In each of these 
cases, overwhelming majority were independent candidates. Election Commission 
of India was forced to print ballot booklets instead of ballot papers. 
6 In the parliament polls of 1985, Palakondarayudu, the candidate of Telugu Desam 
at Raychoti in Cuddapah district, Andhra Pradesh, was unsure of the support of the 
two main local factions. So, allegedly he got the election postponed by killing 
Guvvala Subbarayudu, an independent candidate. He thus gained time to rope in the 
two factions, and succeeded in winning the election held later. In 1989, polls were 
held simultaneously for assembly and parliament in Andhra Pradesh. 
Palakondarayudu was this time a candidate for the assembly. Apprehensive that he 
may repeat his victorious performance, Nagi Reddy, his main opposition, set up a 
pliant man of their own faction, Avula Subba Reddy by name, as an independent 
candidate. To get the election postponed, Nagi Reddy allegedly have him killed the 
day before the election (Balagopal, 2004). 
7 The number of independent candidates in the 2005 parliamentary election in the 
United Kingdom was only 162 for a total of 646 seats. 
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in the year 2004. In the 2004 Lok Sabha election, only 5 out of 2385 
independent candidates in India could win. In contrast, as many as 2370 
independent candidates lost their deposits. However, these figures do not 
truly reflect the importance of independent candidates in the political 
process. Independent candidates as a group got 4.25% of the total valid votes 
in the 2004 parliamentary election in India. In a fragmented polity, these 
figures are not negligible. More importantly, in 116 constituencies out of a 
total of 543, the total number of votes that independent candidates got as a 
group was more than the gap between the winner and his/her nearest rival. 
 
To empirically explain the spatial distribution of independent candidates 
in India in the 2004 Lok Sabha election, we specify a Poisson and a Negative 
Binomial regression framework. Poisson and Negative Binomial regression 
models accommodate the integer property of the count data directly. Further, 
the equations that are used for estimation of parameters in these models are 
similar to more traditional regression models. Because of these attractive 
features, these models have been applied in hundreds of studies involving 
count data.8 . In most such studies, however, specification of Poisson and 
Negative Binomial models were ad hoc and were based on statistical 
convenience.9 In this study, however, attempts are made to show through a 
simple behavioral model why the distribution of independent candidates 
could be Negative Binomial.  
  
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the analytical 
framework. Section 3 discusses the data, carries out a brief descriptive 
analysis and presents the estimated Poisson and Negative Binomial models. 
To check the stability of the estimated coefficients, it also carries out a brief 
bootstrap analysis. Section 4 discusses policy implications of the results. 
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main findings, identifies some limitations 
of this study and suggests a few possible generalizations. The paper has two 
appendices. Appendix A provides the mathematical details about the 
optimization carried out by political parties in the model. It also offers a 
heuristic justification of the Negative Binomial model. Appendix B 
summarizes the process of econometric specification and estimation of the 
model parameters. 
 
 
SECTION 2: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Suppose there are two political parties (say, P1 and P2) fighting in an election 
in a constituency (say, C). Suppose, both P1 and P2 perceive that they have 
equal chance of winning the election. Both parties now realize that if they 
float one or more independent candidates cloning its rival, each voter will 
then vote for each such independent candidate with a small probability at the 
cost of its rival. Both parties, therefore, have incentive to compete with each 
other to float more independent candidates than the rival. As floating such 
candidates is not costless, the ultimate number of independents floated by 
them, however, depends on the resources in their possession. 
                                                         
8 See Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for references. 
9 This includes the study by Lem and Dowling (2006) in the specific context of 
independent candidates. 
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This entire process of floating clone independent candidates may be 
thought of as a Prisoners’ dilemma type game. The game is simultaneous 
because although in principle, each party can observe what the other one is 
doing for some time, crucial adjustments will take place only at the last 
moment of filing nomination. To maximize the chance of winning in this 
game, each political party has to guess the number of independent candidates 
that would be floated by its rival and then need to put one more clone 
independent candidate in addition, provided the party has sufficient 
resources to do that. Appendix A contains a more sophisticated mathematical 
specification that outlines the optimizing behavior of political parties. As 
both political parties would like to outmaneuver each other at the crucial last 
moment of filing nominations, any information obtained prior to that on the 
number of candidates floated by its rival will not be of any use. Appendix A 
also offers a heuristic justification of the Negative Binomial distribution 
through the “memorylessness” associated with this process.  
 
We now discuss some implications and generalizations of this simple 
model. First, if both parties have unequal strength in a constituency and both 
perceive that cloning is unlikely to change the outcome, then cloning may 
not take place at all. In our model, political parties will float clone candidates 
only if they are within budget and floating such candidates lead to an 
expected win.10  
 
Second, the same framework can be generalized to take care of “rebel” 
candidates. Political parties are not homogeneous entities. If a particular 
person in a political party is not selected as its candidate and decides to run 
as independent, the same candidate may be interpreted as an independent 
floated by the other political party at zero cost. 
 
Third, standard results on Prisoners’ Dilemma indicate that any tacit 
understanding between the two political parties is likely to be unstable. The 
incentive to “cheat” is strong, especially in political games of this type which 
is repeated infrequently and where the stake is high. Further, even if a tacit 
pact is there, if a free rider decides to take advantage of his/her similarity 
with one of the candidates, the fragile pact may break down due to 
misunderstanding. 
 
Fourth, with three or more political parties having equal strength, the 
situation becomes more complex. Each political party will now have to field 
independent candidates against all its rivals. Like in the classical Prisoners’ 
Dilemma with multiple players, detection of the cheater becomes more 
difficult because even if “clones” are identified, one may not know which 
political party has floated the clone. 
 
Fifth, all political parties have strong incentives to not to disclose their 
hands early in this game. Therefore, we hypothesize that unsavory political 
competition will lead to a rush in filing nominations of independent 
candidates at the last moment.                                                          
10 Political parties sometimes may think of the “big picture”. If one party is sure to 
win majority of seats, then that party may not be interested to take part in a cloning 
battle in a constituency where the chance of winning is same for all parties. 
Similarly, desperation to win the majority of seats may force some party to start 
cloning battle in a constituency in unfavorable circumstances. 
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Sixth, in this model, constituency size does not play any role. Rather, 
the important roles are played by the number of non-independent candidates 
in fray. An observable implication of the model is that ceteris paribus, 
number of independent candidates will be unaffected by constituency size, 
but will have an increasing relationship with the number of non-independent 
candidates. 
 
 
SECTION 3: DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYYSIS 
 
The data for this paper have been downloaded and compiled from the 
website of the Election Commission of India (ECI) [http://www.eci.gov.in]. 
The ECI website contains detailed election results of all constituencies for all 
parliamentary elections in India. In this study, we focus on the year 2004 
only. For each constituency, the name, age, sex, political affiliation and the 
number of votes obtained by each candidate have been recorded. For each 
candidate, we also know their caste status. In some cases, a constituency 
itself is declared a reserve constituency – sometimes for scheduled castes 
(SC) and sometimes for scheduled tribes (ST). 
 
A conceptual difficulty encountered here is to define independent 
candidates empirically. This is because many bizarre candidates stand in 
Indian elections under the garb of a political party.11 Election Commission 
publications list 173 parties categorized as “Registered (Unrecognised) 
Parties”, sometimes with strange names like Bharatiya Muhabbat Party (All 
India) or Vijeta Party. Together, these 173 parties fielded a total of 898 
candidates in the parliamentary election of 2004. 12 Barring a few exceptions, 
majority of them did not join any coalition involving National or State 
parties. Further, many of them floated candidates in a single constituency 
only. As majority of these candidates behaved like independent candidates 
and economic or political theories do not provide clear answer to their status, 
in this paper we define independent candidates as per official Election 
Commission categorization.  
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Number of Candidates per Parliamentary Seat 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Series              Mean      Standard Deviation       Skewness       Kurtosis      Minimum       Maximum 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1)                  (2)                   (3)                             (4)               (5)                  (6)                   (7) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
INDCAN         4.39                3.77                         1.89 (#)        6.74 (#)           0.00                30.00 
NONIND         5.62               2.25                          1.04 (#)        1.56 (#)           1.00                16.00 
TOTCAN        10.01              4.92                          1.30 (#)        3.04 (#)           2.00                35.00 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Table 1 compares the statistical features of independent (INDCAN), non-
independent (NONIND) and total number of candidates (TOTCAN) per                                                         
11 The situation is not unique in case of India. Bizarre candidates stood under such 
labels as BELLS (Ban Every Licensing Law Society) or SBILP (Southport Back in 
Lancashire Party) in the 1983 parliamentary election in the United Kingdom and 
could actually manage to get 75 and 374 votes respectively (Moores, 1987). 
12 Individually, only 8 among these 173 parties managed to get more than 0.10% of 
the total votes polled in the 2004 election.   
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constituency. Table 1 reveals that on average, a constituency in India had 
more than four independent candidates in the 2004 parliamentary election. 
This number is smaller than the average number of non-independent 
candidates per constituency. However, Table 1 also shows that variation in 
the number of independent candidates is high. Further, all important 
summarized measures other than mean (e.g., range, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis) are higher for INDCAN than for NONIND.  
 
We now examine to what extent the variation in INDCAN across 
constituencies could be explained through covariates. The first covariate of 
interest is the size of the total electorate. In the context of the US, Lem and 
Dowling (2006) have recognized that the impact of population size on 
emergence of smaller parties and independent candidates would be 
ambiguous (p. 473). This observation is consistent with our theoretical 
framework, in which, the number of independent candidates, ceteris paribus, 
will not depend upon population size but on political fragmentation proxied 
by the average number of non-independent candidates participating in an 
election. Lem and Dowling (2006) have, however, obtained a positive 
impact of constituency size on the emergence of independent candidates. In 
their estimated Negative Binomial regression models, both population size 
and population density turn out to be strongly significant. 
 
The year 2004 elections in India give us a rare opportunity to examine 
the impact of population size because in that year assembly elections were 
also held in several of the Indian States. These States are Andhra Pradesh, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Karanataka, Maharashtra, Orissa and Sikkim. Other than 
Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, the remaining four States in India are large 
States. Together the six States cover 143 constituencies in the Indian 
Parliament.   
 
Note that the simultaneous or near-simultaneous holding of assembly 
and parliamentary elections in these States work like a controlled experiment 
where impacts of other factors are likely to be similar, so that the partial 
impact of increase in population size could be examined. One exception 
which weakens our argument is the difference in the security deposit money 
in case of parliamentary (Rs.10,000/- for general and Rs.5,000/- for SC and 
ST candidates) and assembly elections (Rs.5,000/- for general and Rs.2,500/- 
for SC and ST candidates. We, however, stress that this difference is small 
and symbolic and hence is unlikely to play an important role in elections. 
Further, it may be noted that besides the security deposit, all major electoral 
formalities in India (e.g., signature requirements etc.) are same for assembly 
and parliamentary elections. It may be noted that roles of these other 
formalities in increasing transaction costs cannot be ignored. Further, 
international evidence suggests that indirect transaction costs are more 
important determinants than deposit money per se. For example, Stratmann 
(2005) observes that collection of signatures is likely to involve larger 
monetary and nonmonetary costs than the average filing fee. 
   
Table 2 presents the number of independent candidates per constituency 
in case of both the parliament and the assembly elections in select States. 
Note that average population size in parliamentary constituencies would be 
about six times larger than that in assemblies for all States in Table 2. Still, 
except in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, in all cases the number of 
independent candidates per constituency is slightly more in case of assembly 
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elections in Table 2. The stability of these numbers appears to be consistent 
with an implication of our model that population size may not be an 
important determinant of independent candidates.   
 
To estimate the impact of the population in the Negative Binomial 
model, we have defined a variable named TOTVOT which measures the 
total number of voters (in millions) in a constituency. It may be noted that 
constituency sizes in India were based on the distribution of population in 
the year 1971. As subsequent population growth rates in different parts of 
India were different, TOTVOT varies substantially across constituencies. 
The unequal constituency size enables us to test the impact of population 
size in the estimated Negative Binomial regression models in a similar 
manner as in Lem and Dowling (2006). 
 
 
Table 2: Number of Independent Candidates in States where Elections in Both 
Parliament and Legislative Assembly Took Place in the Year 2004  
       
Parliamentary Election Legislative Assembly Election 
State Total 
Seats 
Independent 
Candidates 
[Total 
Candidates] 
Independent 
Candidates 
per Seat 
Total 
Seats 
Independent 
Candidates 
[Total 
Candidates] 
Independent 
Candidates 
per Seat 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Andhra 
Pradesh 42 114 [279] 2.71 294 872 [1896] 2.97 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 2 6 [13] 3.00 60 48 [168] 0.80 
Karnataka 28 40 [172] 1.43 224 442 [1715] 1.97 
Maharashtra 48 151 [412]  3.15 288 1083 [2678] 3.76 
Sikkim 1 0 [4]  0.00 32 16 [91] 0.50 
Orissa 21 26 [100] 1.24 147 295 [802] 2.01 
Note: The numbers within third bracket are total number of contestants .in that state. 
 
 
An important source of heterogeneity in the number of independent 
candidates that is related to population size is the reservation status of the 
constituency itself. In the 2004 Parliamentary election, 79 seats were 
reserved for SC and 41 for ST candidates. ECI data on candidates reveal that 
the numbers of independent candidates in General, SC and ST constituencies 
are 4.88, 3.30 and 1.44 on average. In the econometric models, two dummies 
named SC and ST are specified to capture the impact of reserved 
constituencies.  
 
Another important source of variation in INDCAN is the extent of 
urbanization in a constituency. In this paper, we have categorized the status 
of urbanization of a constituency based on the CCA and the HRA 
classification. The dummy variable METRO reflects the highest category 
and consists of six cities, viz., Delhi, Bombay, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore 
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and Hyderabad. Together, they consist of 26 parliamentary seats.13 TIER II 
cities are cities listed as category B cities in both CCA and HRA 
classification. Seven constituencies match with these cities, viz., 
Ahmedabad, Pune, Kanpur, Surat, Jaipur, Lucknow and Nagpur. TIER III 
cities are category C and D cities in terms of CCA and HRA classification. 
Together, they span 35 constituencies.14 It may be noted that together the 
CCA and HRA classifications A – D cover almost all the major State 
capitals. All remaining constituencies are categorized as OTHERS. We 
observe that constituencies in OTHERS have only 3.99 independent 
candidates on average. Similar figures for TIER III, TIER II and METRO 
cities are 5.97, 8.57 and 8.41 respectively.  
 
Empirically, defining constituencies that attract more media attention is 
not straightforward. Typically, media attention is more in constituencies 
where an elite politician or a celebrity is a candidate. Our theory is that these 
constituencies will have more independent candidates because: (i) a certain 
section of the population may have disillusions against incumbent politicians 
and their families, and, (ii) free riders would target these candidates to get 
mileage out of the extra media attention. 
 
An empirical problem in constructing the variable is the lack of reliable 
data on media attention or recall factor for each candidate. An occasional 
choice pursued currently is to proxy the recall factor by the number of 
Google hits. Such a measure, however, is not without problems – especially 
if candidate names are common.15 The number of Google hits, unless 
suitably refined, will not therefore be appropriate.  Alternatives like lists 
maintained by experts, governmental agencies or reputed NGOs etc are also 
not readily available for the 2004 election in usable format.   
 
In this study, we define a dummy variable named ELITE that takes the 
value unity for a constituency if a candidate in that constituency satisfies any 
one of the following conditions: 
(1) A current or ex-cabinet minister or current or ex-speaker of  
            the Lok Sabha 
(2) A current or ex-chief minister of a State in India 
 
Note that the variable ELITE basically characterizes senior politicians. To 
capture the spirit, we have, therefore, made a few exceptions to the above 
rule. Four senior politicians, viz., Suresh Kalmadi (Pune), Mani Shankar 
Aiyar (Mayiladuturai), Somnath Chatterjee (Bolpur) and Shibu Soren 
(Dumka) have been considered elite politicians based on judgment. Each of 
the four maintained a high profile in the media either due to their position or 
due to their action. Suresh Kalmadi was an important sports official and 
headed the Indian Olympic Association for a long time. Mani Shankar Aiyar 
was a career bureaucrat whose views and articles used to appear in the media                                                         
13 We have also included a few congested suburbs (e.g., Jadavpur and Dum Dum in 
case of Kolkata) as parts of these metros. In case of Hyderabad and Kolkata, their 
twin counterparts (e.g., Secundrabad and Howrah respectively) have also been 
included as METRO constituencies. 
14 Bhattacharya (2010) presents the detailed lists of constituencies belonging to 
METRO, TIER II and TIER III. 
15 In the Indian context, duplication of candidate names could be a conscious 
electoral choice to confuse the voters – an issue that we discuss in this paper later. 
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on regular basis. Somnath Chatterjee was the leader of the Left in the 
parliament for a number of years. Shibu Soren headed Jharkhand Mukti 
Morcha and had important influence in the coalition politics at the central 
level. Including the above four, the total number of ELITE constituencies in 
our database is 63. 
 
The second dummy variable constructed to capture a similar impact is 
called DYNAST. The variable DYNAST is unity for constituencies in which 
family members (e.g., wife/son/daughter/brother/sister/in-laws etc.) of elite 
politicians were candidates. Our data set has 29 such constituencies.   
 
Finally, another dummy variable constructed to capture the impact of 
VIPs is called CELEB. CELB is unity for constituencies in which noted 
celebrities (e.g., film-stars, artists, musicians, players etc.) have appeared as 
candidates. Our data set provides 17 such constituencies.16  It may be noted 
that although in theory a constituency could ELITE, DYNAST and CELEB 
constituency simultaneously, instances of duplication are rare. 
 
We note that ELITE constituencies on an average have about 5.5 
independent candidates vis-à-vis 4.2 in case of non-ELITE ones.  A similar 
pattern is observed for DYNAST where the average numbers are 6.3 and 4.3 
respectively. For CELEB, the averages are 5.6 and 4.4 respectively.  
Interestingly, if one considers the constituencies for the leader and the 
deputy leader of the incumbent government (A. B. Vajpayee in Lucknow 
and L. K. Advani in Gandhinagar) as well as the leader of the opposition 
(Sonia Gandhi in Rae Bareli)17, these three constituencies have 18, 8 and 9 
independent candidates respectively.  
 
In so far as political fractionalization is concerned, it can be measured 
in alternative ways. One approach is to use traditional indices of political 
competition as in Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993).18 Holbrook and Van 
Dunk's indicator is an average of four components, viz., (1) the winning 
candidate's percentage of the popular vote, (2) the winning candidate's 
margin of victory, (3) whether or not the seat is "safe" (winning percentage 
of 55 percent or more), and (4) whether or not the race was contested. These 
four components are then averaged into a single index. 
 
Another approach to measure political fractionalization would be 
through shares of votes of different political parties. Mimicking market share 
indices, one may define vote shares of top few (say, 2 or 3) political parties 
as an indicator of fractionalization. Alternatively, one may also compute 
Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for different constituencies or States based on 
vote shares. 
 
                                                        
16 See Bhattacharya (2010) for a detailed list of ELITE, DYNAST and CELEB 
constituencies. 
17 Officially, there was no clear deputy leader of the opposition prior to the election. 
18 Another popular measure of political competition is the Ranney Index. However, 
it is sometimes felt that Holbrook and Van Dunk's measure is a more reliable 
indicator of party competition. For example,  Lem and Dowling (2006) has argued 
that the Ranney Index taps more directly into party control and is not as exhaustive 
as the measure proposed by Hollbrook and Van Dunk (1993).  
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While these indices would reflect different aspects of political 
fractionalization in a constituency, a common econometric argument against 
their use will be the endogeneity problem. In case of 2004 parliamentary 
election in India, if one uses the data on that same election to compute 
fractionalization, that would be an ex post computation. Ideally, one needs ex 
ante measures of political fractionalization. One problem with ex ante 
measures is that the data on earlier parliamentary elections that took place in 
India in 1999 would not reflect the current situation if not anything else but 
for the popular saying that a week is a long time in politics. 
 
In this study, we attempt to measure political fractionalization by the 
number of non-independent candidates. Note that while this definition of 
political fractionalization may not be an ideal one, this is consistent with our 
theoretical framework because our theory suggests an increasing relationship 
between NONIND and INDCAN. In case of the 2004 parliamentary 
election, the correlation coefficient between INDCAN and NONIND turns 
out to be 0.29. 
 
Empirically, political fractionalization may be measured at the 
constituency level as well as at the State level. Several studies in the past 
have pointed out the States as important cleavages in the Indian context 
(Mitra and Singh, 1999; Chhibber, 1999). In this study, we, therefore, 
attempt to measure fractionalization both at the State and at the constituency 
level.  
 
 
 
 
 
When NONIND is averaged at the State level, the correlation of INDCAN 
with that variable (AVNONIND) increases marginally to 0.30. To capture 
fractionalization at the constituency level, we compute a variable named 
CONSTITUT which is the deviation between NONIND and AVNONIND. 
The variable CONSTITUT reflects the excess number of non-independent 
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candidates in the constituency compared to the average number of non-
independent candidates in a State.  Interestingly, correlation coefficient 
between INDCAN and CONSTITUT turns out to be only 0.10, indicating 
that INDCAN is more affected by fractionalization at the State level rather 
than at the constituency itself. 
 
Figure 1 plots the average number of independent candidates for 
constituencies with specific number of non-independent candidates. Figure 1 
reveals a strong increasing relationship between the two variables.19 The 
weighted correlation coefficient between the two variables in Figure 1 is 
about 0.88.  
 
 
 
 
The estimated weighted least squares equation is as follows: 
 
(3.1)  AVINDCAN = 1.6771 + 0.4834 NONIND   
     (3.91)        (6.82) 
R2 = 0.93 
 
[Note: The bracketed figures are estimated t-statistics] 
 
Finally, INDCAN also fluctuates widely across States. Figure 2 plots 
the spatial distribution of average number of independent candidates 
(AVIND, bars in Figure 2) along with the ratio of independent to non-
independent candidates (IND/NONIND, lines in Figure 2) across States. 
 
                                                        
19 In Figure 1, the number of constituencies with 1 non-independent candidate was 
only one. Similarly, the number of constituencies with more than 12 independent 
candidates was only 4. Hence, the rightmost point and the three leftmost points in 
Figure 1, the averages are computed on small number of observations. Therefore, 
these points are not reliable. 
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Figure 2 highlights that while the average numbers of independent 
candidates are only 1.24 and 1.43 for Orissa and Karnataka respectively, the 
same numbers are as high as 10.00 and 10.02 in case of Delhi and Tamil 
Nadu.  Further observations reveal that the IND/NONIND ratio in Figure 2 
appears to be fairly stable and generally, is within the range of 0.5–0.7 for 
most States. The ratio is low in case of Orissa and Karnataka (less than 0.5), 
but high in case of Tamil Nadu (2.2).  
 
The case of Tamil Nadu deserves special attention because it provides 
additional circumstantial evidence of cloning. A particular way of confusing 
the voter would be to float candidates with the same name. It appears that 
this practice had been more prevalent in the state of Tamil Nadu than in 
other States. Because of certain features in Hindu Tamil naming convention, 
obtaining candidates with same name is easier in case of Tamil Nadu than in 
other States of India. Out of 39 parliamentary constituencies in Tamil Nadu, 
we encounter the phenomenon of duplication of name of at least one of the 
non-independent candidates with an independent candidate in ten 
constituencies.  These constituencies are: Madras North, Chengalpattu, 
Arakkonam, Tiruppattur, Vandavasi, Tiruchengode, Pollachi, Karur, 
Sivaganga and Sivakasi. Out of these, the case of Arakkonam highlights the 
malaise. In this constituency, the main fight was between “Velu, R” of PMK 
and “Shanmugam, M” of ADMK. Twenty candidates fought in that 
constituency. Among these, eight were non-independent and twelve were 
independent. Interestingly, there were 4 independent candidates with names 
“Velu” and 2 independent candidates with names “Shanmugam”. “Velu R” 
won by a margin of well over 1,00,000 votes. Despite these observations, 
one cannot still prove that the independent Velu’s and Shanmugan’s were 
clones and not just free riders. However, given that the 1999 parliamentary 
election in the same State did not experience any duplication of candidate 
names of this proportion, the phenomenon certainly deserves more scientific 
attention along with sociological explanation. 
 
Because of the high number of independent candidates with significant 
duplication of candidate names, Tamil Nadu is being treated as a separate 
and somewhat anomalous case in our study. The dummy TN reflects 
constituencies in the state of Tamil Nadu. We have also added two other 
dummies for the States of Karnataka (KARNATAKA) and Orissa (ORISSA) 
for our model.  
 
Table 3 presents the results of the fitted Poisson and Negative Binomial 
models. Results in Table 3 appear to be consistent with the descriptive data 
analysis. All the coefficients have expected signs. Further, except the 
variables TOTVOT, CONSTITUT and CELEB, all other estimated 
coefficients turn out to be statistically significant in case of both the Poisson 
and the Negative Binomial model. A point to note is that all common 
coefficients of both Poisson and Negative Binomial models other than the 
INTERCEPT are close in Table 3. As these common coefficients attempt to 
explain the mean, this is not surprising. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Estimated Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression Models 
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Notes: 
1. Here ***, ** and * denote significance at 1.0, 5.0 and 10.0 per cent level 
              of significance only. 
 
2. The numbers in third bracket for TAPE denotes the computed values of 
               TAPE for the respective simple models without covariates. 
 
 
Results in Table 3 help us to identify three major factors behind 
variations in the number of independent candidates. First, a major 
determinant of the number of independent candidates is political 
fractionalization. Results suggest that the number of non-independent 
candidates would typically lead to more independent candidates in the fray. 
Results further corroborate that the major determinant appears to be 
fractionalization at the State level rather than at the constituency itself.  
 
Second, Table 3 highlights that ceteris paribus, constituencies with 
VIPs or their family members have more independent candidates. 
Interestingly, constituencies with other celebrity candidates do not reveal 
this pattern. As veteran politicians and their families tend to chose “safe” 
seats, it is likely that due to lack of sufficient incentives, these seats would 
be relatively free from the competition of floating independent candidates. 
Therefore, one possible explanation is that this phenomenon could be a 
manifestation of disillusion of a certain section of the population about the 
existing political incumbents. For other celebrities, who are relatively non-
veterans, the “anger” may not be as much. A second possible explanation is 
that as good many among the other celebrities are first-time entrants in 
     
Poisson Negative Binomial Variables 
Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INTERCEPT 0.2101 2.14**  0.8373 3.88 ***  
TOTVOT 0.0769 1.34                       0.1001 1.16      
SC -0.3506 -4.96 *** -0.3143 -3.07 *** 
ST -0.8917 -7.10 *** -0.8631 -4.94 *** 
METRO 0.4566 7.27 *** 0.4605 4.84 *** 
TIER2 0.5885 5.20 *** 0.5991 3.50 *** 
TIER3 0.2509 4.07 *** 0.2507 2.67 *** 
ELITE 0.1921 4.18 *** 0.1758 2.35 **  
DYNAST 0.2318 4.08 *** 0.2093 2.30 **  
CELEB 0.0976 0.53              0.1293 0.49     
AVNONIND 0.1827 14.62 *** 0.1840 9.81*** 
CONSTITUT 0.0099 0.93          0.0075  0.47     
TN 1.1129 24.07 *** 1.1124 15.41 *** 
ORISSA -0.5986 –3.12 *** –0.5733 –2.10 **  
KARNATAKA -0.8948 –5.16 *** –0.8374 –3.67 *** 
DELTA     1.9511 6.15 *** 
Sample Size 543 543 
Log-Likelihood -1503.15 -1213.54 
AIC 3036.30 2459.08 
SIC 3100.76 2527.83 
TAPE 0.16 [0.53] 0.13 [0.15] 
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electoral politics, typical anti-establishment arguments may not be an 
adequate “selling point” for free riders to snatch the limelight away from 
celebrities who are often veterans in media management themselves. It may 
be noted that for all practical purpose, the set of disillusioned independent 
candidates who specifically target political veterans and families behave like 
free riders. It is, therefore, difficult to trace the exact motive unless further 
data on independent candidates become available.  
 
Third, our results suggest that although population size is not a 
significant determinant of independent candidates in India, SC and ST 
constituencies had significantly lower number of independent candidates. 
This is because potential supply of independent candidates is much less in 
these constituencies compared to unreserved ones. 
 
It may be noted that for goodness of fit measures, the standard chi-
square test cannot be carried out because the possible values taken by the 
dependent variable may not be high compared to the number of parameters. 
One can increase the number of cells by separately looking across various 
covariate groups. However, there could be too many possible covariate 
combinations. Hence, if the number of observations is not too high, there 
would be many cells with only a few observations and this will make the 
chi-square test invalid. In this paper, we measure goodness of fit by Total 
Absolute Prediction Error (TAPE) as defined by Cooil (1991).20 
 
For both the Poisson and the Negative Binomial models, the computed 
values of TAPE are reported in Table 3. Expectedly, the Negative Binomial 
model fits better than the Poisson model. Poisson models grossly 
underestimate the probability of zero independent candidates and 
overestimate that of one candidate. Both the models are improvements over 
their simpler counterparts. However, though TAPE for the Negative 
Binomial model with covariates is the lowest in Table 3, the gain in terms of 
log-likelihood and other model fitting criteria is small vis-à-vis its simple 
counterpart. In general, the estimated t-statistics for the coefficients in the 
Negative Binomial model also turn out to be smaller than those of the 
Poisson model. Together, they imply that even the simple Negative Binomial 
model would be a reasonably good model to begin with.  
 
Figure 3 presents the actual and the fitted models with covariates. Figure 3 
indicates a bi-modal pattern in the observed frequency distribution of the 
independent candidates. The bimodality suggests that the observed 
distribution could be weighted sum of two standard unimodal distributions. 
Importantly, the theoretical framework in Section 2 suggests that mixture 
Negative Binomial models could be a more general choice compared to 
simple ones. In this paper, though the fits of both the Poisson and the 
Negative Binomial models good, they are unimodal models and, therefore, 
they fail to explain the local peaks in INDCAN around 7 and 8.  
  
 
                                                        
20 See Appendix A for a brief discussion. 
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To examine the stability of the estimates, we carry out a small bootstrap 
analysis for the Negative Binomial model. We randomly divide 
constituencies into two parts, viz., Subsamples (S-S) 1 and 2 respectively. 
We estimate the model separately for each of the two subsamples. This 
exercise is replicated four times. 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the bootstrap exercise. Table 4 reflects 
that barring a few exceptions for statistically insignificant coefficients, all 
other estimated coefficients are of the same sign with the corresponding 
coefficients in Table 3 and are close to them in general. Further, most of the 
estimated coefficients in Table 3 lie between the intervals created by the 
corresponding coefficients in a particular bootstrap. Even in a few cases 
where an estimated coefficient in Table 3 does not lie in such intervals, 
either the interval is too narrow or the coefficient in Table 3 misses the 
interval narrowly.   
 
Table 4 also presents the in-sample and out-of sample forecast performances 
based on the bootstrap sub-samples. In sample TAPE’s are calculated based 
on the estimated parameters of a sub-sample on the observed values in that 
sub-sample. Out-of-sample measures, in contrast, are computed using the 
observations in the other sub-sample as the actual ones. Table 4 reveals that 
the computed out-of-sample TAPE statistic has fluctuated between 0.12 and 
0.26, with median values in the range of 0.20. These values are reasonable 
and together they imply that the model will not be affected too much by 
sampling fluctuation. The average in-sample TAPE value in Table 4 is also 
in the range of 0.16–0.17, not too distant from the TAPE value of 0.13 of the 
Negative Binomial model in Table 3. The goodness of fit statistics obtained 
from bootstrap forecast measures, therefore, enhance the credibility of the 
model.    
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Table 4: Results on Bootstrap 
         
Bootsrtap 1 Bootstrap 2 Bootstrap 3 Bootstrap 4 
  
S-S 
1.1 
S-S 
1.2 
S-S 
2.1 
S-S 
2.2 
S-S 
3.1 
S-S 
3.2 
S-S 
4.1 
S-S 
4.2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept 0.64 1.25 0.66 1.14 1.09 0.64 1.66 0.15 
TOTVOT 0.37 -0.08 0.12 0.10 #0.14 #0.11 -0.01 0.35 
SC -0.29 -0.37 -0.25 -0.39 -0.35 -0.28 -0.28 -0.40 
ST -1.13 -0.65 -0.81 -0.91 -0.68 -1.03 -1.03 -0.66 
Metro 0.33 0.54 0.48 0.43 0.58 0.33 0.43 0.61 
TIER2 0.49 1.03 0.53 0.64 0.72 0.56 0.63 0.53 
TIER3 0.16 0.48 0.08 0.30 0.31 0.19 0.25 0.21 
ELITE 0.21 0.14 0.28 0.09 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.19 
DYNAST -0.10 0.44 0.19 0.30 0.06 0.32 0.29 0.17 
CELEB 0.14 -0.02 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.19 0.13 0.24 
AVNONIND 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.21 
CONSTITUT -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
TN 0.97 1.23 1.20 1.01 1.07 1.12 1.01 1.11 
ORISSA -0.64 -0.51 -0.63 -0.57 -0.32 -0.77 -1.13 -0.20 
KARNATAKA -1.07 -0.67 -0.81 -0.86 -1.05 -0.59 -0.68 -0.93 
DELTA 1.69 2.98 #2.02 #2.15 2.54 1.69 3.29 1.59 
Sample Size 272 271 272 271 272 271 272 271 
Log-Likelihood -605.5 
-
573.9 -579.0 -607.6 -591.1 -595.8 -583.9 -598.4 
In-Sample 
TAPE 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.10 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.19 
Out-of-Sample 
TAPE 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.12 
Notes:  
1. S-S i.j reflects results based on the data in Subsample 1 in the first 
random allocation exercise. 
2. Here, # before the estimated coefficients (in bold font) in bootstrap i 
(i=1,2,,3,4) indicates that the corresponding coefficient does not lie between the 
interval created by the estimated coefficients in S-S 1 and S-S 2 for that bootstrap.  
 
 
 
 
SECTION 4: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
From social perspective, emergence of too many independent candidates is 
not a healthy sign in a democracy. McKnight (1999), in the following 
paragraph summarizes the rationale of regulating independent candidates 
succinctly: 
 
“There are two major reasons why a state may want to regulate 
candidates who run without party affiliation. First, a state has an 
interest in protecting the integrity of the political party process. 
This interest includes the goals of (1) stopping intraparty fights 
after the primary in order to have a settled contest, and (2) 
preventing one party from “raiding” another’s votes by running 
a party candidate disguised as an independent. Second, a state 
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has an interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral 
process. This includes such concerns as verifying that a 
candidate is truly independent, keeping the ballot a manageable 
length, and ensuring that candidates on the ballot are serious 
and have a minimal level of support that would make it possible 
for them to govern if elected.” 
 
Political scientists have suggested different policies to prevent the 
emergence of independent candidates in elections. Some, especially in the 
context of the US, have actually been implemented. Although these policies 
vary in detail, the underlying idea is to increase the transaction costs of 
independent candidates to a level so that competing in an election becomes 
“unprofitable”. McKnight (1999) discusses three basic types of statutes used 
in the US to regulate independent candidates, viz., (i) the early filing 
deadline, (ii) the “sore loser” statute, and, (iii) a disaffiliation statute. 
 
Early filing deadline forces candidates to declare themselves as 
independents or members of a specific party at an early date. The apparent 
theory is that requiring early filing will prevent someone who is really a 
disappointed party member from seeking office later in the election as an 
“independent” (McKnight, 1999). A “sore loser” statute prevents a defeated 
primary candidate from appearing on the general election ballot as an 
independent. Under disaffiliation statute, a candidate must certify that she or 
he does not belong to any political party in order to run as an independent. 
 
In the context of the US, these regulations have increased the 
transaction costs of small party and independent candidates substantially. 
However, it may be noted that some of these regulations like disaffiliation 
etc. require open access to political party membership data and are not 
feasible in the context of developing countries. Some other electoral 
restrictions that are popular in existing democracies involve increasing the 
requirements minor party candidates must meet to appear on the ballot. 
These restrictions typically include filing fees and signature requirements.   
 
Among these two, increasing the signature requirements appears to be 
more effective in controlling the entry of independent candidates (Stratmann, 
2005, p.62). The signature requirements in case of some of the states in the 
US gubernatorial elections could be very high. For example, Alabama 
requires that an independent candidate or new party obtain signatures equal 
to 3 percent of the previous gubernatorial vote (Lem and Dowling, 2006). 
For ballot access in the 2002 election, this would require 39,536 signatures. 
New Jersey electoral law, on the other hand, requires only 800 signatures, 
which is a static requirement (Lem and Dowling, 2006). 
 
Based on this experience, a few possible policies in the Indian context could 
be:  
• To increase the signature requirements for independent candidates 
substantially. The signature requirements could be relaxed for those 
independent candidates who had demonstrable success in earlier 
local or assembly elections.21                                                          
21 Independent candidates may directly enter as a candidate in a Parliamentary 
election with the support of a political party. 
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• To empower the Election Commission to impose a differential 
deposit scheme for different types of constituencies (e.g., as the 
problem due to free riders is more in urban constituencies, deposit 
money charged for these constituencies could be more) in so far as 
independent candidates are concerned.  
 
Given the incentive structure in the political game, it is also necessary to 
examine the detailed asset data and income tax returns of all independent 
candidates for a few subsequent years after participation in elections. 
 
Incidentally, while all major parties currently have incentive to cheat 
each other under the existing rules of the game reported in this study, they 
also have incentives to change the rules of the game in their favor vis-à-vis 
smaller political parties and independent candidates.22 A classic example of 
changing the rule of such political games in the Indian political context is the 
enactment of the anti-defection legislation. Similar to anti-defection 
enactment, if major political parties in India favor long-term gain vis-à-vis 
short term ones, they can collude together to redesign the institutional 
constraints in their favor by increasing the transaction cost of participation of 
independent candidates. 
 
 
 
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION 
 
The paper attempted to explain the emergence of independent candidates in 
Indian parliamentary election in the year 2004. We specified a model of an 
FPTP electoral system in which political parties themselves float dummy 
independent candidates to gain electoral advantage. We showed that in a 
fragmented political milieu with relatively weak institutional infrastructure, 
such unsavory behavior of political parties could lead to a Prisoners’ 
dilemma type game where each party tries to guess the number of 
independent candidates that would be pitted against it by others. We 
proposed that in this game, the perceived probability distribution of the 
number of independent candidates floated against one political party by 
another would be “memoryless”. Using this property and a few other 
simplifying assumptions, we showed that the spatial distribution of 
independent candidates would follow a Negative Binomial distribution. 
While many studies in the past modeled count data like independent 
candidates in this way, in most such studies, specification of Poisson and 
Negative Binomial models were ad hoc and were based on statistical 
convenience. In this study, however, attempts were made to show through a 
simple behavioral model why the distribution of independent candidates 
could be Negative Binomial.  
 
Our empirical results revealed that the distribution of independent 
candidates in India could be explained well with a Negative Binomial 
probability model. Our results highlighted the roles three major factors 
played in the emergence of independent candidates. First, a major 
determinant of the number of independent candidates was political                                                         
22 For example, it is often said that Democrats and Republicans do not often agree, 
but one thing they do agree on is that they both dislike third parties (Lem and 
Dowling, 2006). 
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fractionalization. As suggested by our theory, empirical analysis revealed 
that more number of non-independent candidates in a constituency would 
typically lead to more number of independent candidates. Interestingly, 
results pointed out that in case of India, the major determinant was the 
political fractionalization at the State level rather than at the level of the 
constituency. Second, we found some evidence that ceteris paribus, 
constituencies with VIPs or their family members had more independent 
candidates. Interestingly, constituencies with other non-incumbent 
celebrities did not reveal this pattern. Third, our results indicated that 
although population size was not a significant determinant of independent 
candidates in India, reserved constituencies had significantly lower number 
of independent candidates due to lower potential supply of independent 
candidates compared to unreserved ones. 
 
We now discuss a few limitations and possible generalizations of this 
study. First, our theory indicates the possibility that mixture Negative 
Binomial models could be a more general choice of probability distribution 
compared to simple ones (Appendix A). Empirical observations on the 
spatial distribution of independent candidates also revealed a bi-modal 
pattern that is typical for mixture distributions. 
 
Second, it may be noted that in this paper, we have maintained the 
formal distinction of small political parties and independent candidates in 
India. As candidates of many small parties in India behave like 
independents, one may treat them as independents. However, incentives of 
smaller parties, especially if they float candidates in more than one 
constituency, may be more general and not necessarily focused on a 
particular constituency. Working with them, therefore, brings many complex 
issues like coalition formation in a democracy.  Still, it is important to 
examine whether including them as independents would change some of the 
main results reported in this paper. 
 
Third, the paper’s coverage of the role of incumbency in the emergence 
of independent candidates was partial. Our results on VIP constituencies 
indicate the possibility that incumbent and established politicians disillusion 
a section of the population more, leading to more independent candidates in 
such constituencies. One can generalize this concept and test whether 
incumbent members of parliament or “tainted” politicians (e.g., politicians 
with criminal record) attract more independent candidates. To have the data 
on incumbency, one needs to match the electoral records of earlier elections 
in India, which was beyond the scope of this study. Similarly, to identify 
“tainted” politicians, one needs to prepare the detailed affidavit data on 
candidates in clear database format.  
 
Fourth, one factor whose impact on the emergence of independent 
candidates could not be tested was the heterogeneity of the population in a 
constituency. Many constituencies in India are heterogeneous in terms of 
caste, religion, language and income or wealth. In these constituencies with 
multiple cleavages, there could be several interest groups based on complex 
combinations of these factors. Therefore, it is likely that the number of 
independent candidates in these constituencies would be more. At this stage, 
detailed data on all the variables across constituencies are not available in 
India. Common sense, however, suggests that cities will be more 
heterogeneous than villages. Therefore, the observed significance of 
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METRO, TIER2 and TIER3 constituencies in our study highlights the need 
to have such data for better identification of factors. 
 
Fifth, in this paper, we hypothesized that when there is unsavory 
competition among political parties in floating independent candidates, there 
will be a last minute rush in filing nominations. Unfortunately, we could not 
test the hypothesis due to lack of data. A verification or refutation of the 
hypothesis would be an important progress in our understanding of electoral 
behavior and strategies adopted by political parties, especially in developing 
and emerging market economies. Our study, therefore, highlights the need 
for having this data in usable format in the public domain. 
 
Sixth, more research is needed on the backgrounds of the independent 
candidates themselves. In particular, we need to know the detailed history of 
their occupations and interests so that the reasons for their fighting in 
elections and the incentives they have could be clearly quantified.  
 
Seventh, a weakness of the paper is that a good fit of the Negative 
Binomial model does not provide a direct proof that political parties float 
independent candidates for electoral benefits. Our theories are based on 
incentives and empirical results are based on circumstantial evidence rather 
than rigorous proof. However, given the widespread actual existence of 
“strange bedfellows” in politics across countries and over time, more 
research is needed on the actual behavior of candidates in elections in India. 
For example, our study indicates the importance of electoral budgets in 
floating independent candidates. It, therefore, highlights the need for more 
credible auditing of the accounts of political parties and candidates, 
including independent candidates. Extending this argument further, a crucial 
part of our understanding of the incentives of all major players would also 
come from studies that observe post-election behavior and asset 
accumulation and not just during the election period. 
 
Future research on these aspects will not only help in understanding the 
spatial distribution of independent candidates in India further, it will also 
improve transparency in the electoral process and through this, cleaner 
political behavior in India. 
 
Finally, the problem addressed in this paper and the issues raised are not 
just relevant for India, but for all democracies with an FPTP electoral system 
in place. The process of globalization and emergence of multicultural 
societies in many old and established democracies in recent years may lead 
to multiple cleavages in their polity. In such situations, competition among 
the mainstream parties may create a political vacuum leading to the 
emergence of smaller parties (e.g., Liberal Democrats in case of the UK) or 
independent candidates (e.g., Ross Perot in case of the US). If institutional 
structures in democracies allow this trend to continue, it has the potential to 
turn an established bi-party system into a complex multi-party system. Our 
results indicate that such situations would lead to the emergence of more 
independent candidates, enhancing the complexity of political management. 
In extreme case, some of these independent candidates could be floated 
discreetly by the mainstream political parties to gain electoral advantage.  
Because of the nature of the incentives of political parties, FPTP electoral 
systems are especially susceptible to such phenomena.  Such electoral 
systems, therefore, need to put appropriate institutional constraints in place 
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by increasing the transaction costs of smaller parties and independent 
candidates. 
 
 
APENDIX A 
 
THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
ITS IMPLICATIONS  
 
Suppose, there are N voters in a constituency (say, C). Suppose two political 
parties, say P1 and P2, are fighting an election in C. Each party assumes that 
in a direct contest, each of the voters will vote for both the candidates with 
probability (1/2). Both parties also know that if they float one or more 
independent candidates cloning its rival, each voter will then vote for each 
such independent candidate with probability δ (where δ is small and close to 
zero) at the cost of its rival. For example, if P1 floats K independent 
candidates (viz., I11, I12, … I1K) and P2 floats L independent candidates (say, 
I21, I22, …, I2L)  then each neutral voter will vote with a (K+L+2) 
dimensional  Multinomial probability distribution (½ - Lδ, ½ - Kδ, δ, δ, 
…δ). The first two components of this vector reflect probabilities in favor of 
P1 and P2 respectively and the remaining (K+L) components are in favor of 
independent candidates.  
 
The objective of each political party is to win the election at minimum cost. 
Suppose, party Pi could afford to spend at most Fi amount on floating 
independent candidates. Suppose each independent candidate costs D, which 
is same for both the parties. However, budgets on independent candidates are 
closely guarded secret and therefore, both P1 and P2 do not know how much 
its rival can spend on floating independent candidates.  
 
Then the optimization problem of party P1 is: 
 
(A.1)        M1 = m1  for   m1 >0,      m1 D ≤ F1, and, 
     E(Z1) – E(Z2) > 0. 
                     = 0 otherwise 
 
where M1 is the number of independent candidates floated by P1 and E(Zi) is 
the expected number of votes in favor of party Pi (as perceived by P1). The 
optimization problem of P2 may also be expressed in a similar manner. 
 
As both political parties would like to outmaneuver each other at the crucial 
last moment of filing nominations, any information obtained prior to that on 
the number of candidates floated by its rival will not be of any use implying 
that the  number of independent candidates floated by one’s rival is likely to 
be “memoryless”, e.g.,  
 
(A.2)  P [ Mi  > (a+b) | Mi > b ] = P [ Mi > a ] i=1,2 
 
It is well known that the property of memoryless-ness in (A.2) characterizes 
the Geometric distribution. Therefore, the number of independent candidates 
floated by each political party, in this case, will be a Geometric distribution. 
Since two political parties come to the decision of floating “clone” 
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candidates independently in our model, the resulting distribution of the total 
number of independent candidates would be Negative Binomial. 
 
Generalizing, when s parties are having equal committed vote shares and 
voters vote for each political party with probability (1/s), each of these s 
political parties will have to float “clones” for all its (s-1)   rivals. Note that 
in theory, if s political parties have equal strength in a constituency and each 
one floats at least one clone independent candidates against others, the total 
number of independent candidates would be at least s(s-1) in that 
constituency. The actual number in reality is likely to be less. The case of 
more than two political parties having equal real or perceived strength in a 
constituency is rare. Therefore, our model cannot suggest an exact functional 
relationship between the number of non-independent and independent 
candidates other than that the last is an increasing function of the first. The 
relationship, however, provides upper bound for some parameters in the 
perceived probability distributions. When s political parties have equal 
strength in a constituency and each one floats independent candidates against 
others randomly, total number of independent candidates becomes a random 
variable that is a sum of s(s-1) independent Geometric random variables. 
This observation suggests that even the parameters of Negative Binomial 
distribution could be heterogeneous across constituencies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APENDIX B 
 
ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
 
Let Xk be a Bernoulli indicator random variable reflecting the choice of the 
k-th “neutral” voter in C, with P[Xk = 1] = p and P[Xk=0] = (1–p). Define 
. Then, Y denotes the number of independent candidates in C.  
 
Clearly, Y ∼Binomial (n,p). However, common sense suggests that in this 
case n would be very large and p would be very small. Hence, the 
probability mass function of Y can be approximated by a Poisson (λ) 
distribution, e.g.,  
 
(B.1)  P[Y = y] = (e–λλ y )/y! 
 
where λ≈np  and E(Y) = Var(Y) = λ .  
 
When the dependent variable is a count variable, a Poisson specification like 
(B.1) is often the starting point. Empirical studies, however, suggest that in 
case of count variables, E(Y) = Var(Y) is a restrictive specification because in 
cross-section, one often encounters the problem of over-dispersion, e.g., 
E(Y) < Var(Y).  
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The problem of over-dispersion occurs if the λ parameter in (B.1) is not 
homogeneous in the population. Negative Binomial distribution is a 
probability distribution that satisfies the property of over-dispersion and 
becomes a natural specification in such cases. Negative Binomial 
specification may also be treated as a generalization of (B.1). If the Poisson 
parameter λ is treated like a random variable that follows Γ(φ, δ) [e.g., a 
Gamma distribution with parameters φ, and δ respectively], then the 
resulting distribution turns out to be a Negative Binomial distribution with 
the following probability mass function: 
 
 
 
Here, the first two moments of Y are: E(Y) = φ /δ and Var(Y) = [φ (1+δ)]/δ2. 
Therefore, the variance to mean ratio of this distribution is: 
 
(B.3)  Var(Y) / E(Y) = (1+δ)/δ > 1 
 
Thus, the parameter δ takes care of the phenomenon of over-dispersion 
mentioned above. Note that as δ→∞, the probability mass function of 
Negative Binomial in (B.2) tends to that of Poisson distribution.  
 
In empirical studies the parameters λ in case of Poisson or φ and δ in case of 
Negative Binomial distribution may be estimated by standard techniques like 
method of moments or maximum likelihood.  
 
For more general Poisson regression models with covariates, we assume that 
Yi, the number of independent candidates in constituency i, follows Poisson 
(λi). We specify, 
 
(B.4)  λi = eZiβ 
 
where Zi is a K× 1 vector of characteristics of the i-th constituency and β  is 
the corresponding parameter vector. The log-likelihood function for the n 
constituencies is then written as: 
 
 
 
The gradient and the Hessian can be written as: 
 
 
 
 
 
The expressions in (B.6) and (B.7) reveal some special advantages of the 
specification in (B.4). First, an implication of equation (B.4) is that equation 
(B.6) becomes analogous to the more familiar normal equations in a standard 
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regression specification. The regression property of this specification comes 
from the fact that E(Yi) = λi, so that (Yi - λi) may be interpreted as the 
residual. Second, the specification in equation (B.4) guarantees that the 
estimated value of λi is always nonnegative, thus ensuring meaningful results 
(Hausman et al, 1984).  
 
In case of Negative Binomial regression, we specify  
 
(B.8)  φi =  eZiβ 
 
Where Zi and β  are as in (B.4). The log-likelihood function, the gradient and 
the Hessian are once again standard and the method of estimation of 
parameters is as in the case of the Poisson regression (Hausman et al, 1984).  
 
The parameter vector β  is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. 
Alternatively, an iterative nonlinear weighted least squares method may also 
be used. Under some mild conditions, the likelihood function becomes 
globally concave and convergence takes place rapidly (Hausman et al, 
1984).  
 
To measure the goodness of fit of the models, we follow Cooil (1991). Let pj 
be the observed proportion of constituencies with j independent candidates. 
We define the corresponding model estimates as the average unconditional 
predictive probabilities 
 
  
Here  is the estimated conditional probability that constituency i, the 
number of independent candidates is j. These probabilities are averaged 
across all n constituencies.  
 
Following Cooil (1991), we measures goodness of fit by the Total Absolute 
Prediction Error (TAPE) in estimation as: 
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